Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Mental states: Mental states are internal states of mind that include thoughts, feelings, emotions, sensations, and perceptions. They are subjective experiences that cannot be directly observed by others. See also Brain states, Brain, Thoughts, Thinking, Cognition, Consciousness, Perception, Sensation, Emotions, Behavior._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Anita Avramides on Mental States - Dictionary of Arguments
I XI Avramides thesis: in favour of a subjective concept of mind, which is incompatible with Gricean reduction. I 109 Mental/Nagel/Davidson: both, Nagel and Davidson: the impossibility of access is in the method! >Mind/Davidson, >Understanding/Davidson, >Understanding/Nagel. I 135 Objective mind/(AvramidesVs): the idea of an objective mind stems from Descartes. >Objective mind. Instead: Equal access for all, there is no first-person perspective, there is no "as it is"; there is no uniqueness. >First Person, >Mind/Descartes, >Thinking/Descartes._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
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> Counter arguments against Avramides
> Counter arguments in relation to Mental States
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28